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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2004).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff incorrectly states the issues for review in his Appellate Brief.
Therefore, Defendants' statement will include a recap of the issues stated
by Plaintiff, followed by a correct statement of the issues.
Plaintiffs Statement of the First Issue: "The 180-day statute of
limitations at UCA Sec. 67-21-4(2) (2004) is superceded by Notice of Claim
provisions at UCA Sees. 63-30d-402 and 403 (2004) under Hall v.
Department of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, 24 P.3d 958." (PL's App. Br., p. 1).
Plaintiffs Statement of the Second Issue: "Summary judgment was
not appropriate because the facts 1-16 in the defendants' statement of facts
that are deemed admitted by rule CJA 4-501 [now URCP 7] did not settle
the question and require the court to engage in further impermissible factfinding and to apply an incorrect legal standard." (PL's App. Br., p. 1).
Pursuant to the procedural history of this case, as well as Plaintiffs
Notice of Appeal, Plaintiffs statement of issues is incorrect. Defendants
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum, to
which Plaintiff replied with a Motion to Strike. (R. 87; R. 127; and, R. 131
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respectively).

The Trial Court granted Defendants' Motion and denied

Plaintiffs. (R. 166).
Prior to entry of the relevant Order, Plaintiff filed a Motion for New
Trial, claiming the Trial Court erroneously granted Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiff's Motion to Strike.

(R. 168;

Supporting Mem. at R. 173). The Trial Court denied the Motion for New
Trial and Plaintiff appeals that denial, as well as the prior rulings
underlying the Motion. (Rul. on Mot. for New Tr., R. 206; Or., R. 213; Not.
ofApp., R. 214).
The 180-day statute of limitations to which Plaintiff refers in his
Statement of the First Issue for Review is the basis upon which the Trial
Court granted Summary Judgment dismissing only Plaintiffs First Cause
of Action. (R. 161). The statute of limitations argument cannot constitute
an issue for review in and of itself, separate from the granting of summary
judgment on all causes of action. Accordingly, the appropriate issues for
review are as follows:
ISSUE ONE: Did the Trial Court correctly deny Plaintiffs Motion for
a New Trial, based on its determination that no error of law existed to
support Plaintiffs Motion?
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Standard of Review: In reviewing a Trial Court's denial of a
motion for new trial, Appellate Courts will reverse the Trial Court only for
abuse of discretion after looking at the background of the situation
underlying the denial. Smithv. Shreeve, 551 P.2d 1261, 1262 (Utah 1976).
ISSUE TWO: Did the Trial Court correctly deny Plaintiff's Motion to
Strike Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum, based on Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration and U.R.C.P. 56?
Standard of Review: Because the Trial Court denied Plaintiffs
Motion to Strike based on application of legal rules and standards, this
issue presents a question of law that the Appellate Court reviews under a
correction of error standard. In the Matter of Baby Boy Doe, 894 P.2d 1285,
1287 (Utah App. 1995).
ISSUE THREE:

Did the Trial Court correctly grant Defendants'

Motion for Summary Judgment, based on the uncontroverted facts
presented in Defendants' Supporting Memorandum?
Standard of Review: In considering a grant of summary
judgment, Appellate Courts review the Trial Court's legal determinations for
correctness, giving no deference, and reviewing the facts in the light most
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favorable to the nonmoving party. Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 48 P.3d 941,
944 (Utah 2002).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
Because the Rules of Appellate Procedure require both appellants and
appellees to include a section in their briefs stating how the issues were
preserved, it is necessary for Defendants to argue under this section that
the issues were not preserved. (Utah R. App. P. 24(b)(2004)). Accordingly,
Defendants make those arguments here rather than including them in the
argument section of their brief.
Plaintiff Failed to Preserve Issues One and Two
Regarding the Court's Denial of His Motion for
New Trial and Denial of His Motion to Strike
Despite Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal stating that Plaintiff was appealing
from the Trial Court's denial of his Motion for New Trial and the Court's
decisions on the underlying Motions, Plaintiff failed to preserve those issues
because he did not comply with the briefing requirements set forth in Rule
24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Regarding preservation of the
issues, U.R.A.P. states:
[The appellate brief must contain] citation to the
record showing that the issue was preserved in the
trial court; or
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A statement of grounds for seeking review of an
issue not preserved in the trial court.
U.R.A.P. 24(a)(5)(A) and (a)(5)(B).
In State v. Lucero, 47 P.3d 107 (Utah App. 2002) this Court addressed
whether certain issues were properly preserved. The Court declined to
reach the issues raised for appeal because the appellant failed to
adequately brief those issues. Id. at 109-10. Specifically, the appellant
failed to cite where the issues for appeal were preserved in the record and
to set forth the applicable standard of review. The appellant's brief also
failed to cite adequate legal authority or sufficiently argue the allegations he
raised.

Id.

See also, U.R.A.P. 24(a)(9) (requiring citations and legal

authority to support arguments).
Likewise, Plaintiffs Appellate Brief in this case fails to even identify
the Motion for New Trial and/or Motion to Strike as issues, let alone to
address the standard of review or include citations to the record where the
issues were preserved. Nor does Plaintiffs brief contain adequate citations
and legal authority supporting his arguments. For example, Plaintiff argues
that the Trial Court improperly refused to consider certain documents upon
which Plaintiff sought to rely below, citing the Court's Ruling on Plaintiffs
Motion for New Trial. However, Plaintiff provides no supporting authority
as to why the Court's refusal to consider those documents was erroneous,
-5-

such that would warrant reversal of the Court's denial of Plaintiffs Motion
for New Trial based on the applicable standard of review. (PL's Brief, pp.
10-11, citing R. 204).
Moreover, Plaintiffs brief refers to his Motion to Strike and the Trial
Court's ruling thereon at various times throughout pages 1-11 of his brief.
(PL's Br, pp. 1-11). Again however, Plaintiff fails to cite any supporting
authority stating why the Trial Court erred in its ruling and why this Court
should reverse the ruling based on the applicable standard of review.
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to preserve the first two issues for appeal and
the Court should decline to reach those issues.
Plaintiff Failed to Preserve Issue Three for
Appeal Regarding the Trial Court's Grant of
Summary Judgment for Defendants
The issue of whether the Trial Court erred in granting Summary
Judgment was not preserved for appeal because Plaintiff did not properly
oppose Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff instead chose
to rely upon a Motion to Strike that did not identify any disputed facts. (R.
168). Plaintiff also filed a Rule 56(f) request for an extension of time to file
an opposition. (R. 129). The Trial Court did not rule on the Rule 56(f)
request, but Defendants' counsel voluntarily granted an extension of time
for Plaintiff to oppose the Motion.

(Letter from Michael F. Skolnick to
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Robert Copier, Sept. 19, 2003, R. 135). Plaintiff still failed to timely oppose
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
It is well established in Utah that an appellate court will not consider
an issue raised for the first time on appeal. See, ONGInternational (U.S.A.),
Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993). Thus the Court
should decline to review the issue of whether the Trial Court erred in
granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. See also, Clegg
v. Lee, 516 P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1973) (refusing to consider argument for
first time on appeal where appellants offered no affidavits opposing
summary judgment that set forth facts supporting their claim).
Oral argument was held on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike and
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on February 26, 2004.
Plaintiffs counsel argued at the hearing, for the first time, that disputed
issues of fact existed which precluded Summary Judgment. The Trial Court
ruled that Defendants' statement of facts was deemed admitted, based on
Plaintiffs failure to oppose those facts in writing as required by Rule 56(e)
and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. (R. 166 - R.
162). The attempts of Plaintiffs counsel to dispute the facts for the first
time at the motion hearing does not constitute raising such arguments
below for purposes of appellate review. See, Shire Development v. Frontier
-7-

Investments, 799 P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990). In Shire, this Court refused
to consider, inter alia, an argument the appellant raised on appeal, holding
that because the appellant only raised the argument briefly during oral
argument on summary judgment, the argument was not sufficiently
preserved for appeal. Id. at 224.
Moreover, in Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah App. 1996) this
Court refused to consider a claimant's estoppel argument on appeal since
the claimant had not properly preserved that argument, despite the fact she
had mentioned it in her answer and referenced it in oral argument during
the hearing on the opposing party's motion for summary judgment. Id. at
364. Specifically, this Court stated:
Although [appellant] mentioned estoppel in her
answer and made some references to the issue in a
hearing before the trial court, these nominal
references did not sufficiently raise the issue to a
level of consciousness before the trial court.
Id.

Therefore, Plaintiffs presentation of substantive arguments in

opposition to Summary Judgment for the first time at oral argument did not
preserve these arguments for appeal.
Despite his failure to oppose Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, following issuance of the Court's Memorandum Ruling denying
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
-8-

Judgment, Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial and

Supporting

Memorandum, citing to the Trial Court's alleged dilatory conduct in
handling the Motion to Strike. (R. 168; R. 173). Plaintiff then filed a
"Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial/Denial of
Summary Judgment" ("Supplemental Memorandum") arguing for the first
time that the Trial Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs First Cause of Action
based on the statute of limitations. (R. 192 - R. 194). The Trial Court
refused to consider the arguments because Plaintiff failed to seek leave of
court to file a supplemental memorandum as required by U.R.C.P. 7(c)(1).
(R. 204).
Regarding the remaining causes of action: intentional infliction of
emotional distress, constructive termination, defamation and punitive
damages, Plaintiff presents in his Appellate Brief, for the first time,
substantive arguments against dismissal of those claims. (PL's App. Br.,
passim).

Plaintiff cannot oppose Summary Judgment on substantive

grounds for the first time on appeal when he did not do so in opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Utah Rules of Jud. Adm. 4-501 (2003), MOTIONS: Reproduced

in the Addendum hereto.
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2.

Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-2. et seq. (2003). UTAH PROTECTION

OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ACT (the "Whistle Blower Act"): Reproduced in the
Addendum hereto.
3.

Utah Code Ann. 8 63-30d-402 (2003) [63-30-13 at the relevant

time].
A claim against a governmental entity, or against an
employee for an act or omission occurring during
the performance of the employee's duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is
barred unless notice of claim is filed with the person
and according to the requirements of Section 6 3 30d-401 within one year after the claim arises
regardless of whether or not the f u n c t i o n giving
rise to the claim is characterized a s governmental.
4.

Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (2004). NEW TRIALS; AMENDMENTS OF

JUDGMENT: Reproduced in the Addendum hereto.
5.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (2003). SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Reproduced

in the Addendum hereto.
6.

Utah R. App. P. 24 (2004). BRIEFS: Reproduced in the

Addendum hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Because the procedural history of this case is addressed in detail
above, Defendants' Statement of the Case will be brief. This case arises out
of the former employment of Plaintiff as a Police Officer for Lehi City.
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Plaintiff ultimately resigned and subsequently filed suit against the
Defendants making whistle blower claims and alleging intentional infliction
of emotional distress, constructive termination, defamation and punitive
damages.
After the close of discovery, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on all causes of action, which the Trial Court granted. (Mot., R.
87; RuL, R. 166; Or., R. 195). At the same time, the Trial Court denied
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
(RuL, R. 166; Or., R. 195). Plaintiff then filed a Motion for New Trial which
the Court also denied. (Mot. R. 169; RuL, R. 206; Od., R. 213).
In addition to the procedural history of this case, the following facts,
taken from Defendants' Statement of Facts relied upon in their Motion for
Summary Judgment, are undisputed and relevant to the issues:
1.

Plaintiff Charles Douglas Fannen ("Fannen") officially started

work as a Police Officer for the Lehi City Police Department ("the
Department") on April 27, 1998. Prior to that time, beginning in July of
1997, he worked for Lehi City as a Reserve Police Officer. (Defs.' Mem. in
Suppt. of S.J., R. 126).
2.

Approximately four to five months after he started as a Police

Officer, in about July or August of 1998, Fannen started receiving flyers in
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his mailbox at work making derogatory comments and jokes about him
and/or his wife. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 126 ).
3.

In approximately December of 1998, Fannen anonymously

contacted the Workers Compensation Fund Fraud Investigation Department
to report what he alleged was a fraudulent Workers Compensation claim
made by Defendant Sergeant James Munson ("Defendant Munson"), also a
Lehi City employee. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 126 ).
4.

Fannen made the report because he thought the Department

through Chief of Police and Defendant

Karl Zimmerman

("Chief

Zimmerman") was "covering up" for Defendant Munson. (Defs.' Mem. in
Suppt. of S.J., R. 126 ).
5.

In late fall of 1999, Fannen went to Chief Zimmerman, showed

him the notes he had received in his mailbox, and requested Chief
Zimmerman to do an investigation and address it at the next Department
meeting, which Chief Zimmerman did. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R.
125).
6.

After the Department meeting, the notes stopped for more than

1 V2 years. Then in approximately May of 2001, Fannen received another
note in his mailbox stating: "leave . . . leave . . . leave." (Defs.' Mem. in
Suppt. ofS.J., R. 125).
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7.

After the "leave . . . leave . . . leave" note, Chief Zimmerman

called a follow-up Department meeting during which he stated to the
Department members that the notes better stop and if it happened again,
every Department member would undergo a lie detector test, including
Fannen and even Chief Zimmerman himself. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J.,
R. 125).
8.

Fannen does not know who left the notes in his mailbox. When

asked during his deposition if he was accusing Defendant Munson of
leaving the notes, Fannen responded: "I do not know who did it. . . I do not
know - who did it." (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 125).
9.

In approximately May of 2001, Fannen was traveling in Colorado

when some truck drivers on the highway made him angry, at which time
Fannen flashed his police badge at the truckers. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of
S.J., R. 125).
10.

On June 20, 2001, Fannen was asked to resign, and did resign.*

(Defs/ Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 124).
11.

Fannen was told the reason the Department wanted his

resignation was because of the incident with the truck drivers in Colorado.
(Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 124).
1

Fannen's last day of work with Lehi City was June 20, 2001.
However, his salary and benefits continued to September 30, 2001.
-13-

12.

Fannen acknowledges that the emotional distress he claims to

have suffered as a result of Defendants' alleged actions ended on the date
he resigned, June 20, 2001. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 124).
13.

Fannen testified that he had a good reputation as a Police

Officer and although he believes the Defendants attempted to ruin that
reputation, they did not succeed in doing so. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J.,
R. 124).
14.

On December 9, 2001, Fannen was hired as a Police Officer by

the Alpine/Highland Police Department. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R.
124).
15.

When he applied for a position with the Alpine/Highland Police

Department, Fannen had to undergo both a written and verbal
psychological evaluation and never mentioned on either that he was
suffering any emotional distress. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 124).
16.

On February 4, 2002, Fannen filed a Notice of Claim with Lehi

City. (Defs.'Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 123).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Should this Court determine to reach the issues, Defendants make
the following arguments in favor of affirming the Trial Court's Rulings:
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THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
THE COURT APPROPRIATELY
RULED THAT ITS HANDLING OF THE MOTION TO
STRIKE WAS NOT DILATORY AS ALLEGED BY
PLAINTIFF. THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO ERROR
IN LAW THAT WOULD WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.
APPLYING A CORRECTNESS STANDARD, THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE BECAUSE THE
COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE LAW TO
DETERMINE THAT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
SUPPORTING
MEMORANDUM
COMPLIED
WITH
THE
APPLICABLE RULES.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO ALL CAUSES OF
ACTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OPPOSE
DEFENDANTS' MOTION. IN ADDITION, SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE ON THE MERITS.
A.

Summary Judgment was proper on procedural
grounds because Plaintiff did not oppose the
motion.

B.

Summary J u d g m e n t was appropriate on the
merits as to each cause of action a s follows: 1)
Plaintiffs whistle blower claims were not
timely filed and in any case, Plaintiff h a s no
evidence to show who committed the alleged
acts. 2) The alleged acts at issue do not reach
the level of intolerance necessary to succeed
on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress and Plaintiff did not suffer severe
emotional distress. 3) Defendants violated no
public policy that would create an exception to
Plaintiff's at will employment status and
support a constructive termination claim. 4)
-15-

Plaintiff admits he suffered no harm to his
reputation, so his defamation action cannot
stand. 5) Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's
fees or punitive damages because those are
not permitted by statute.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs appeal should be dismissed for his failure to preserve the
issues for review.

However, should this Court determine to reach the

issues, the Trial Court's rulings should be affirmed on the following
grounds.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE COURT DID
NOT COMMIT ERROR IN ITS HANDLING OF THE
MOTION TO STRIKE

The Trial Court's denial of Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial was not an
abuse of discretion. In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for new
trial, the appellate court will reverse the trial court only for abuse of
discretion based upon the background of the situation underlying the
denial. Shreeve, 551 P.2d at 1262.
Plaintiff does not argue in his Appellate Brief that the Trial Court
abused its discretion, but simply claims that the Court should have
considered his arguments regarding the appropriate statute of limitations
on Plaintiffs whistle blower claim. However, the Trial Court did not reach
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that issue because Plaintiff failed to address it in his moving memorandum,
raising it only in his Supplemental Memorandum (discussed further infra).
Based on prior rulings of this Court, the Trial Court would have
committed error if the Court had considered the arguments made in the
Supplemental Memorandum, therefore, even if he had sought leave of Court
to file the Supplemental Memorandum, the Trial Court could not have
considered the arguments raised therein. Id. In the case of U.P.C., Inc. v.
R.O.A. General, Inc., 990 P,2d 945, 953 (Utah App. 1999), this Court
disposed of an appellant's argument because he did not raise the argument
in his moving papers below, but did so for the first time in his reply brief in
support of his motion to revise the Trial Court's Summary Judgment ruling.
Id.
Instead of citing to appropriate legal authority in support of his
arguments, Plaintiff simply argues that the Trial Court erred in considering
certain documents (specifically a letter from Plaintiff to Lehi City) in ruling
on Summary Judgment, yet refusing to consider the same documents when
Plaintiff attempted to rely upon them in his Supplemental Memorandum,
stating "[w]hat is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander."

(PL's App.

Br., p. 12). This argument not only fails to cite any legal authority, but it
is entirely misguided.

First, Plaintiff could not rely on such evidence
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because it was contained in a pleading the Trial Court would not consider
because Plaintiff failed to seek leave of court.
Second, the Trial Court made clear that even if the Supplemental
Memorandum would have been properly filed, Plaintiff failed to provide
supporting sworn testimony or an affidavit to rebut the sworn testimony in
Plaintiffs deposition cited in support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R. 204). Therefore, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to consider Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum and denying
Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
DENIED
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE BECAUSE
DEFENDANTS ADEQUATELY PRESENTED THEIR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Trial Court properly denied Plaintiffs Motion to Strike because
Defendants' Motion for Summary J u d g m e n t and Supporting Memorandum
met the requirements of Rule 4-501 and U.R.C.P. 56. Defendants' Motion
and Supporting Memorandum contained an appropriate statement of facts,
citations to the record with attached documentation and extensive legal
citations and argument. As the Court stated, Defendants' moving papers
contained the elements required u n d e r U.R.C.P. 56 and Rule 4-501. (R.
166-164). Therefore, any technical error in Defendants'moving papers (e.g.
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the heading on the fact section did not contain the word "undisputed") was
harmless.
The Utah Supreme Court h a s held consistent with the Trial Court's
ruling, noting that where a party's memorandum otherwise contained the
necessary elements, with applicable citations and legal authority, "the
failure to comply with the technical requirements of Rule 4-501(2)(B) [was
harmless]/' Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 89 P.3d 155,
160 (Utah 2004).
On the other hand, Plaintiffs non-compliance with Rule 56(e) and
Rule 4-501 was not simply technical, Plaintiff failed to oppose Defendants'
Motion whatsoever. The only response Plaintiff filed to Defendants' Motion
for Summary J u d g m e n t was the Motion to Strike, which failed to raise even
a single disputed fact or otherwise substantively oppose Defendants'
Motion. Instead, the Motion to Strike argued that Defendants' motion was
facially deficient.

Accordingly, even reviewing the Trial Court's decision

under a correctness standard, the Court properly applied the applicable
rules to deny Plaintiffs Motion to Strike.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS ON ALL
CAUSES OF ACTION ON THE MERITS AND FOR
PLAINTIFF'S
FAILURE
TO
OPPOSE
DEFENDANTS' MOTION

A.

Summary Judgment
Procedural Grounds

Was

Appropriate

on

The Trial Court's grant of Summary J u d g m e n t was appropriate and
should be affirmed because Plaintiff failed to comply with applicable
procedural rules, specifically U.R.C.P. 56(e). That Rule provides:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
his pleading, b u t his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, m u s t set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2003).
In considering a grant of summary judgment, appellate courts review
the trial court's legal determinations for correctness, giving no deference,
and reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
However, the Utah Supreme Court h a s also made clear that although the
court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
this does not m e a n a party can simply rest on his pleadings. Peterson v.
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Coca-Cola USA, 48 P.3d 9 4 1 , 944 (Utah 2002). Specifically, the court in
Peterson stated:
Although upon summary judgment the court m u s t
view all facts and inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, it may not assume facts for which
no evidence is offered. 'Allegations or denials in the
pleadings are not a sufficient basis for opposing
summary judgment.' The non-moving party 'must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.'
Id. at 947 (citations omitted).
Once the proponent of summary judgment establishes a prima facie
case, the b u r d e n then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to
provide evidence in opposition to the motion and supporting the elements
of that party's claim. Id. at 990, citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Thayne v.
Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). Defendants properly
supported their Motion for Summary Judgment with citations to the file and
supporting documents attached, t h u s establishing a prima facie case. It
was then Plaintiffs burden to respond with evidence opposing Defendants'
Motion and supporting the elements of his claim. The Trial Court properly
ruled that Plaintiff failed to meet that burden because he did not properly
oppose Summary J u d g m e n t . (R. 166 - 162). Plaintiffs Motion to Strike was
his only response to Defendants' Motion and did not make even a single
contention that disputed issues of fact precluded Summary Judgment. Nor
-21-

did the Motion to Strike otherwise address the merits of Defendants'
Motion, but simply argued that the Motion and Supporting Memorandum
were facially deficient. (R. 134-131, passim).
The case of Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 38 P.3d 984 (Utah
App. 2001) further supports the Trial Court's ruling. In Debry this Court
held that the Trial Court properly granted the appellee's motion for
summary judgment because the appellant had not satisfied

the

requirements of Rule 56(e). id. at 990. Specifically, this Court stated:
[Plaintiff] failed to submit either an affidavit or any
other acceptable evidentiary materials to rebut the
motion [for summary judgment]. Accordingly, the
trial court properly assumed that no genuine issues
of material fact existed and correctly proceeded to
determine whether CMS was entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
Id. at 990. See also, State Bank of Southern Utah v. Troy Hygro Systems,
Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1277 (Utah App. 1995) (summary judgment
appropriate where opposing parry failed to meet burden of presenting
evidence under Rule 56(e) raising credible issue of material fact).
Despite the fact he failed to dispute Defendants' Statement of Facts
presented in their Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff nonetheless
argues that the Trial Court improperly weighed evidence by failing to
examine allegations in his Complaint which he believes controvert the
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Defendants' Statement of Facts. (PL's App. Br., pp. 18-19 and 24-25). On
this point, Plaintiff cites Francisconi v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 36 P.3d
999 (Utah App. 2001). However, nowhere in Francisconi does the court
address the instant situation where the party challenging the trial court's
weighing of the evidence failed to oppose summary judgment.
Pursuant to Peterson, Plaintiff cannot simply fail to oppose Summary
J u d g m e n t and then rest on his Complaint. Peterson, 48 P.3d at 947. If
Plaintiff wanted the Trial Court to consider facts alleged in his Complaint,
he should have brought those facts before the Court through an opposition
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and properly supported
those facts. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot simply point to his pleadings to
argue for reversal of the Trial Court's ruling granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Rather, Plaintiff is bound to the facts outlined above,
which the Court deemed admitted and upon which Summary J u d g m e n t
was appropriate.
B.

Summary Judgment Was Appropriate
as a Matter of Law as to Each Cause of
Action.

Plaintiffs
Claims

First Cause

of Action: Whistle

Blower

Based on the applicable statute of limitations, Summary Judgment
was an appropriate ruling, dismissing Plaintiffs cause of action under the
-23-

Whistle Blower Act. Pursuant to the Utah Code, an employee making a
claim under the Whistle Blower Act must do so within 180 days "after the
occurrence of the alleged violation

" Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-4(2) (2003).

Based on the undisputed facts, the "occurrence of the alleged violation" was
the day Plaintiff left Lehi City, June 20, 2001, which is also the same day
Defendants' alleged acts ended. (See, Facts 10 and 12 supra). Plaintiff did
not file his Notice of Claim with the State until February 4, 2002, more than
180 days after his resignation on June 20, 2001. (See, Fact 16 supra).
Although Plaintiff filed a Notice of Claim within the one-year period
prescribed by the Governmental Immunity Act. U.C.A. § 63-30-13 [now §
63-30d-402], the specific limitation period provided for in the Whistle
Blower Act applies.
First, the Whistle Blower Act applies only to plaintiffs who are public
employees. Obviously the Utah Legislature intended to create a shorter
statute of limitations than the one-year notice period provided for in the
Governmental Immunity Act. Otherwise, the Legislature simply would have
deferred to that statute of limitations since under both statutes, the
defendant is the State, a governmental entity and/or a government
employee (s).
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Second, the Whistle Blower Act's statute of limitations applies because
it is more specific than the limitation of action provision in the
Governmental Immunity Act.

Utah Courts have held that when two

statutes conflict, the more specific statute applies. See, Floyd v. Western
Surgical Assoc, Inc., 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App. 1989) (specific statute
controls when two statutes treat same subject matter, but one is general
and the other is specific). Both the Governmental Immunity Act and the
Whistle Blower Act address suits against governmental entities and/or
government employees. However, the Whistle Blower Act is specific to
plaintiffs who are employees of governmental agencies, whereas the oneyear limitation period in the Governmental Immunity Act applies generally
to any plaintiff seeking to sue the State, a government entity and/or
government employees. Therefore, the Whistle Blower Act applies and the
180-day statute of limitations precludes Plaintiffs First Cause of Action.
In his Appellate Brief, Plaintiff cites Hall v. Utah State Dept of
Corrections, 24 P.3d 958 (Utah 2001) in support of his argument that the
general statute of limitations in the Governmental Immunity Act trumps the
specific provision in the Whistle Blower Act. (PL's App. Br., pp. 9-12).
Plaintiffs interpretation of Hall is erroneous. In fact, Hall stands for the
exact opposite. As Plaintiff points out, Hall does acknowledge the general
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rule that courts look to the true intent of the Legislature through the plain
language of a statute. However, Plaintiff fails to point out that the Utah
Supreme Court in Hall also held that specific statutory provisions control
over general provisions. Id. at 963.
In Hall the specific provisions of the Whistle Blower Act trumped the
general language contained in the Governmental Immunity Act rendering
the government and its agencies immune from the types of claims brought
by the claimant in Hall

Id. at 963-64. The claimant in Hall was an

employee of the Utah Department of Corrections ("UDC"). The claimant
reported an incident to his superiors wherein one inmate was hazed by
other inmates, allegedly with the encouragement of certain UDC officers.
Id. at 960. The UDC ultimately began an investigation and the claimant
resigned shortly thereafter. Id. The claimant later sued the UDC under the
Whistle Blower Act, alleging he was unable to secure a new job in law
enforcement because the UDC informed potential employers that the
claimant resigned with disciplinary action pending. Id. at 960-61. The
claimant also alleged that he was subjected to harassment and verbal
threats after he made the report. Id. at 961.
The trial court dismissed a majority of the plaintiffs claims because
they were time-barred under the 180-day statute of limitations under the
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Whistle Blower Act, which left only one remaining claim because that claim
arose later and was not time barred under the 180-day provision. Id.
Therefore, the court only entertained the claim that was not time barred,
impliedly ruling that the 180-day limitation period in the Whistle Blower Act
applies to the filing of a Notice of Claim. Id.
The claimant in Hall argued that he should not have to comply with
the Governmental Immunity Act whatsoever because the Whistle Blower Act
created an exception to governmental immunity. This is not the argument
Defendants make. Rather, Defendants acknowledge that the Governmental
Immunity Act is applicable to Plaintiffs claims, but certain provisions of the
Governmental Immunity Act must give way to specific provisions in the
Whistle Blower Act, e.g. the requirement that plaintiff make his claim within
180 days. U.C.A. § 67-21-4(2).
Hall supports Defendants' argument on this point, holding that
"where the government grants statutory rights of action against itself, any
conditions placed on those rights must be followed precisely." Id. at 965,
citing Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 106 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1940). The
Utah government granted a right of action against itself through the Whistle
Blower Act and the conditions placed on that right must be followed
precisely. The 180-day limitation period in the Whistle Blower Act is a
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"condition placed on the right of action against the government" and
therefore must be followed precisely. Plaintiff did not send a notice of claim
until February 4, 2002 {See, Fact 16 supra).
The Hall court ultimately held that although the claimant did have to
send notice of claim under the Governmental Immunity Act, the general
provisions of that Act granting the government immunity from suit, had to
give way to the specific language of the Whistle Blower Act permitting suits
against the government under the circumstances at issue in Hall Id. at
963-64. Specifically, the court stated:
While the Governmental Immunity Act grants broad,
background immunity to the state and its
subdivisions in their roles as public servants, the
Act also explicitly recognizes that such immunity
can be statutorily waived. Here, the Whistle Blower
Act has done just that, allowing claims to be brought
against an 'employing state agency or political
subdivision of the state' . . . Barring such claims
through government immunity would nullify a very
specific statutory provision at the expense of
preserving a much more general one. . . .
Id. at 963-64 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Therefore, Hall is

supportive of the Trial Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's whistle blower claims
based on statute of limitations.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff had timely filed his whistle blower claim,
Summary Judgment was appropriate because he has provided no evidence
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of who committed the alleged acts. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that he
does not know who committed the acts. (See, Fact 8 supra). Therefore, a
jury could not find that the named Defendants committed the alleged acts,
and therefore could not find the requisite liability. Even viewing the facts
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff then, Summary Judgment was
appropriate dismissing his whistle blower claims.
Plaintiffs Second Cause ofAction: Intentional Infliction
Of Emotional Distress
The Trial Court properly concluded that based on the undisputed
facts, Plaintiff could not satisfy the elements necessary to establish a claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Utah Supreme Court h a s
established the necessary elements to p u r s u e a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, holding that the claimant m u s t plead facts
demonstrating the defendant:
Intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the
plaintiff (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional
distress, or (b) where any reasonable person would
have known that such would result; and his actions
are of such a nature as to be considered
outrageous
and intolerable in that they offend against the
generally accepted standards
of decency
and
morality.
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 30 (Utah 2003)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Based on the undisputed facts, Plaintiff has presented no evidence to
show that any of the Defendants left the notes at issue in his Department
mailbox or committed any acts with the purpose of inflicting emotional
distress. Even if Plaintiff had such evidence, the acts alleged cannot be
considered so outrageous and intolerable that they offend against generally
accepted standards of decency and morality. The notes placed in Plaintiffs
Department mailbox may have been unprofessional, insulting and even
childish. However, to be considered outrageous, "the conduct must evoke
outrage or revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair
. . . [liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress] clearly does not
extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions,
or other trivialities." Id. at 32. Therefore, while the behavior of some
Department members may have been insulting or even threatening, this
does not rise to the level of outrageous under Utah case law.
Moreover, in the context of discharge from employment, the Utah
Court of Appeals has held that although every employee who feels he has
been wronged by his employer suffers some level of emotional anguish,
discharge from employment does not rise to outrageous or intolerable
conduct on behalf of the employer which would give rise to a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co.,
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889 P.2d 1382, 1388-89 (Utah App. 1995). In Robertson, an employee was
required to discuss his drug addiction with subordinates and was later
discharged. The court held that the claimant's discharge from employment,
even when coupled with the fact that the employee had to discuss his drug
addiction with co-workers, still did not constitute outrageous or intolerable
conduct which could establish a prima facie claim of emotional distress
against the employer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of the employer. Id.
Even if Defendants' alleged conduct were to reach the requisite level
of intolerability, Plaintiffs cause of action still fails because he did not suffer
severe emotional distress. Shortly after he left Lehi City, Plaintiff applied
for employment with the Alpine /Highland Police Department where he had
to undergo a psychological evaluation. Neither on the written nor oral part
of the evaluation did Plaintiff even mention that he was suffering any
emotional distress whatsoever. (See, Fact 15 supra). Therefore, the Court's
grant of Summary J u d g m e n t was appropriate dismissing Plaintiffs claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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Plaintiffs Third Cause
Termination

of Action:

Constructive

Summary Judgment was appropriate dismissing Plaintiffs claim for
constructive termination because he cannot show that the Defendants
violated any public policy warranting the cause of action. An employment
relationship with no specified term of duration is at-will, meaning the
employee can leave for any reason and the employer can terminate the
relationship for any reason. In order to overcome this presumption and
proceed with a claim for constructive termination, the Utah Supreme Court
has held:
An at-will employee may overcome [the] presumption
by demonstrating that (1) there is an implied or
express agreement that the employment may be
terminated only for cause or upon satisfaction of
another agreed upon condition; (2) a statute or
regulation restricts the right of an employer to
terminate an employee under certain conditions; or
(3) the termination of employment constitutes a
violation of a clear and substantial policy.
Burton, M.D. v. Exam Center Industrial & General Medial Clinic, Inc., 994 P.2d
1261, 1264 (Utah 2000). See also, Rackley v. Fairview Care Centers, Inc., 23
P.3d 1022 (Utah 2001); Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857
(Utah 1997).
The first of the three exceptions to at-will employment does not apply
because Plaintiff does not claim an express or implied employment
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agreement existed that would modify his at-will employment status.
Although the second exception may hypothetically apply based on the
Whistle Blower Act, that statute is Plaintiffs remedy and as demonstrated
by the undisputed facts, the statute of limitations ran before Plaintiff filed
his Notice of Claim. Therefore, the only way Plaintiff could succeed on a
claim of wrongful termination is to show that Lehi City violated a clear and
substantial public policy in terminating his employment.
The Burton court stated that not every employment termination which
violates some public policy is actionable. The public policy violated must be
"clear and substantial," and although declarations of public policy may be
found in constitutions and statutes, not all statements therein are
expressions of public policy. Burton, 994 P.2d at 1264 (citations omitted).
Whether a public policy alleged to be violated is clear and substantial
is a question of law. Rackley, 23 P.3d at 1025. In making this legal
determination, courts are careful to keep the public policy exception narrow
to avoid unreasonably eliminating an employer's discretion to discharge
employees. Id. at 1026. Therefore, public policy will protect only those
principles that are so substantial and fundamental there can be no
question as to their importance for promoting the public good. Id. at 102627.
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In Burton, a physician claimed his employer terminated him based on
his age.

Although Utah has an Anti-Discrimination Act prohibiting

termination of employees over age 40 because of their age, the Act declared
no "clear and substantial" public policy against doing so. Therefore, there
was no support to create a cause of action for wrongful termination.
Despite the fact the Legislature saw fit to draft the statute, the statute did
not demonstrate a pubic policy which is so important to promoting the
public benefit on which Plaintiff could succeed.

Therefore, the Utah

Supreme Court affirmed the lower Court's grant of summary judgment for
the employer. Id. at 1029-30.
Plaintiff s fourth cause of action: defamation
Dismissal of Plaintiffs defamation action was proper where Plaintiff
cannot show that he suffered any harm based on Defendants' alleged
actions. Plaintiffs Complaint does not specify whether he is making a per
quad or per se defamation claim. However, Plaintiff did not make a claim
for special damages for defamation and, therefore, pursuant to Utah law
Plaintiffs defamation claim must be per se. Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318,
320-21 (Utah 1979).

In order to constitute defamation per se, thus

obviating the need to show special harm, the defamatory words at issue
must fall into one of four categories: charge of criminal conduct; charge of
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loathsome disease; charge of conduct incompatible with the exercise of a
lawful business or profession; and, charge of unchastity of a woman. Id.
at 320. The only possible applicable category in this case is charge of
conduct incompatible with the plaintiffs trade or profession.
In addition to falling into one of the four categories, it is necessary for
the plaintiff to show that as a result of the alleged defamatory words, he
suffered actual harm. Id. at 322. Even if Plaintiff could demonstrate any
statement by one of the Defendants attacked his fitness for engaging in his
profession, by his own testimony Plaintiff suffered no damage.

Plaintiff

testified at his deposition that although he believed the Defendants
attempted to harm his reputation as a Police Officer, they were not
successful in doing so. (See, Fact 13 supra).

Therefore, based on the

undisputed fact that Plaintiff suffered no harm, Summary Judgment was
appropriate dismissing Plaintiffs defamation claim.
Plaintiffs Fifth Claim: Attorney's
Damages2

Fees and Punitive

Because Plaintiff h a s no evidence to succeed on his whistle blower
claim, he is not entitled to attorney's fees under that statute. Moreover,

2

A claimant cannot plead punitive damages as an independent
cause of action. Norman v. Arnold, 57 P.3d 997, 1001, n. 2 (Utah 2002).
However, since the Trial Court dismissed punitive damages as a cause of
action, it is argued as such here. (R. 159).
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pursuant to the Whistle Blower Act, Plaintiff would be entitled to nothing
other than injunctive relief or actual damages. See, Utah Code Ann., § 6721-4(2) (2003). Thus, even if the statute of limitations had not run on this
claim, Plaintiff would not be entitled to punitive damages. Moreover, in no
case can any claimant recover punitive damages against a governmental
entity and/or its employees. The Utah Code states that no judgment may
be rendered against a governmental entity for punitive damages. U.C.A. §
63-30-22(l)(a) [now § 63-30d-603].

Therefore, Plaintiffs claims for

attorney's fees, costs and punitive damages were properly dismissed on
Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court's rulings should be affirmed.
The Trial Court properly granted Summary Judgment on all causes of
action both on the merits and because Plaintiffs Motion to Strike failed to
properly oppose the Motion for Summary Judgment.

Moreover, the

subsequent Motion for New Trial was properly denied, as Plaintiff failed to
provide the requisite support to warrant a new trial.
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Accordingly,

Defendants respectfully request the Court of Appeals to affirm the Trial
Court's rulings.

n _day__,of February 2005.
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Rule 24

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

peal, and if the facts already appearing in the
record are sufficient to make the claim, a remand is not needed If defendant merely hopes
to discover evidence suggesting ineffectiveness,
a remand is not allowed, because the purpose of
the rule is not to hold a "mini-trial" on ineffectiveness of counsel. State v. Johnston, 2000 UT
App 290, 13 R3d 175,
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Cited in State v Classon, 935 R2d 524 (Utah
Ct. App 1997), cert granted, 945 P2d 1118
(Utah 1997), State v Bredehofb, 966 P2d 285
(Utah Ct App. 1998), cert denied, 982 R2d 88
(Utah 1999), State v. Simmons, 2000 UT App
190, 398 Utah Adv Rep 7; State v Mecham,
2000 UT App 247, 9 P3d 777.

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page
references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to
the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the
trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved
in the trial court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11)
of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under
which the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument The 'argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citatiofis
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports
the challenged finding.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the
brief unless doing so makes the brie£ unreasonably thick. If the addendum is
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The
addendum shall contain a copy df:
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
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(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the
appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter
service; and
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance
to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions,
findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of
the court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not
include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is
dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the
appellant.
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured
person/' "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of
this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of
this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise
orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief
which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appellee/crossappellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the
appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed -2&
pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's
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answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first
brief The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table
of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the
court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown.
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another.
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending
lawyer.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998;
November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 24
(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts
have long held. See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343,
1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745
P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "lb successfully
appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate
counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Attorneys! must extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's
position. In order to properly discharge the
[marshalling] duty..., the challenger must
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced
at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant
resists.'" ONEIDA/SLIC,
v.
ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc.,

872 P.2d 1051,1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original) (quoting West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
App, 1991)). See also State ex rel. M.S. v.
Salata, 806 P2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991);
Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App.
1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39
(Utah App. 1990).
The brief must contain for each issue raised
on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of review and citation of supporting authority.
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amendment deleted Subdivision (k) pertaining to brief
covers.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutional arguments.
Contents.
—Argument.
—Inappropriate language.
—Standard of review.
—Statement of facts with citation to record.
Failure to file.
—Defective appeal.
Issues not raised at trial.
- Noncompliance with rule.
Properly documented argument.
Reply brief.
Cited.
Constitutional arguments.
In order to make an argument for an innovative interpretation of a state constitutional pro-

vision textually similar to a federal provision,
the following points should be developed and
supported with authority and analysis. First,
counsel should offer analysis of the unique
context in which Utah's constitution developed
with regard to the issue at hand. Second, counsel should demonstrate that state appellate
courts regularly interpret even textually similar state constitutional provisions in a manner
different from federal interpretations of the
United States Constitution and that it is entirely proper to do so in our federal system.
Third, citation should be made to authority
from other states supporting the particular
construction urged by counsel. State v. Bobo,
803 P.2d 1268 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply.
(2) Any other claim under this chapter t h a t is related to a
claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brought
contemporaneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or in a
subsequent action.
1992

63-30-11. Claim for injury — tfbtice —- Contents —
Service — Legal disability -— Appointment of
guardian ad litem.
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that
would apply if the claim were against a private person begins
to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
shall file^ a written notice of claim with the entity before
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as
they are known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian;
and
(ii) directed and delivered to:
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is
against an incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against
a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is against a
school district or board of education;
(D) the president or secretary of the board,
when the claim is against a special district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is
against the State of Utah; or
(F) a member of the governing board, the
executive director, or executive secretary, when
the claim is against any other public board,
commission, or body.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian at the
time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court
to extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental
entity, the court may extend the time for service of
notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall consider whether the delay in serving
the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits.
(d) (i) If an injury t h a t may reasonably be expected to
result in a claim against a governmental entity is
sustained by a potential claimant described in Subsection (4)(a), t h a t government entity may file a
request with the court for t h e appointment of a
guardian ad litem for t h e potential claimant.
(ii) If a guardian ad litem is appointed under this
Subsection (4)(d), the time for filing a claim under
Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 begins w h e n H h e
order appointing the guardian is issued.
2000

63-30-12.

63-30-18

Claim a g a i n s t s t a t e or i t s e m p l o y e e — T i m e

for filing notice.
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act
or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the
attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or
before the expiration of any extension of time granted under
Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
1998

63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee — Time for filing notice.
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of the' employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed
with the governing body of the political subdivision according
to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 withm one year after
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of
time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or
not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
1998

63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by
governmental entity or insurance carrier
within ninety days.
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental
entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the
claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be
deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day
period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has
failed to approve or deny the claim.
1965
63-30-15.

D e n i a l of claim for injury — Authority a n d
t i m e for filing action against g o v e r n m e n t a l

entity.
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action
in the district court against the governmental entity or an
employee of the entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year
after denial of t h e claim or within one year after the denial
period specified in this chapter h a s expired, regardless of
whether or not t h e function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
1987

63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions —
Application of Rules of Civil Procedure.
(1) The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any action brought under this chapter.
(2) An action brought under this chapter may not be tried
as a small claims action and shall be governed by the U t a h
Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent they are consistent with
this chapter.
1999
63-30-17. V e n u e of actions.
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in
which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against
a county may be brought in the county in which the claim
arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a
district court judge of the defendant county, in any county
contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex
parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions including
cities and towns, shall be brought in the county in which the
political subdivision is located or in the county in which the
claim arose.
1983

63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions.
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal
officer or other legal counsel if it does not have a legal officer,
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may compromise and settle any action as to the damages or
other relief sought.
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Administrative
Services may:
(a) compromise and settle any claim of $25,000 or less
in damages filed against the state for which the Risk
Management Fund may be liable;
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or his
representative and the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, compromise and settle
any claim of $25,000 to $100,000 in damages for which the
Risk Management F u n d may be liable; and
(3) The risk manager shall comply with procedures and
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 38b, in compromising and
settling any claim of $100,00Q*or more.
1995
63-30-19. U n d e r t a k i n g r e q u i r e d of plaintiff i n action.
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall file an
undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, b u t in no case less
t h a n the sum of $300, conditioned upon payment by the
plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity
in t h e action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails
to recover judgment.
1965
63-30-20.

J u d g m e n t a g a i n s t g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y bars

action against employee.
Judgment against a governmental entity in an action
brought under this act shall constitute a complete bar to any
action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter,
against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim.

63-30-21.
63-30-22.

1965

Repealed.

1978

E x e m p l a r y or p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s p r o h i b i t e d

— Governmental entity exempt from execution, attachment, or garnishment.
(1) (a) No j u d g m e n t may be rendered against the governmental entity for exemplary or punitive damages.
(b) The state shall pay any judgment or portion of any
judgment entered against a state employee in the employee's personal capacity even if the judgment is for or
includes exemplary or punitive damages if the state
would be required to pay the judgment under Section
63-30-36 or 63-30-37.
(2) Execution, attachment, or garnishment may not issue
against a governmental entity.
1991
63-30-23.

P a y m e n t of c l a i m or j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t state

— Presentment for payment.
Any claim approved by t h e state as defined by Subsection
63-30-2(1) or any final judgment obtained against the state
shall be presented to t h e state risk manager, or to the office,
agency, institution or other instrumentality involved for payment, if payment by said instrumentality is otherwise permitted by law. If such payment is not authorized by law then said
judgment or claim shall be presented tp the board of examiners and the board shall proceed as provided in Section 63-6-10.
1987

63-30-24. Payment of claim or judgment against political subdivision — Procedure by governing
body.
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or any final
judgment obtained against a political subdivision shall be
submitted to the governing body thereof to be paid forthwith
from t h e general funds of said political subdivision unless said
funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted by law
or contract for other purposes,
1965
63-30-25.

P a y m e n t of c l a i m or j u d g m e n t against political subdivision — Installment payments.
If t h e subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during
the current fiscal year it may pay the claim or award in not

900

more than ten ensuing a n n u a l installments of equal size or in
such other installments as are agreeable to the claimant.
1965

63-30-26, Reserve funds for payment of claims or purchase of insurance created by political subdivisions.
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve
fund or may jointly with one or more other political subdivisions make contributions to a joint reserve fund, for the
purpose of making payment of claims against the co-operating
subdivisions when they become payable p u r s u a n t to this
chapter, or for the purpose of purchasing liability insurance to
protect the co-operating subdivisions from any or all risks
created by this chapter.
1983
63-30-27.

Tax l e v y b y political s u b d i v i s i o n s for pay- m e n t of c l a i m s , j u d g m e n t s , or i n s u r a n c e premiums.
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, all
political subdivisions may levy an annual property t a x sufficient to pay the following:
(a) any claim;
(b) any settlement;
(c) any judgment, including any judgment against an
elected official or employee of any political subdivision,
including peace officers, based upon a claim for punitive
damages but the authority of a political subdivision for
the payment of any judgment for punitive damages is
limited in any individual case to $10,000;
<d) the costs to defend against any claim, settlement, or
judgment; or
(e) the establishment and maintenance of a reserve
fund for the payment of claims, settlements, or judgments
as may be reasonably anticipated.
(2) It is legislative intent t h a t the payments authorized for
punitive damage judgments or to pay the premium for such
insurance as authorized is money spent for a public purpose
within the meaning of this section and Article XIII, Sec. 5,
U t a h Constitution, even though as a result of the levy the
maximum levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded. No
levy under this section may exceed .0001 per dollar of taxable
value of taxable property. The revenues derived from this levy
may not be used for any other purpose than those stipulated in
this section.
1988
63-30-28.

Liability i n s u r a n c e — P u r c h a s e of i n s u r a n c e
or self-insurance by g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y authorized — E s t a b l i s h m e n t of trust a c c o u n t s
for self-insurance.
(1) Any governmental entity within the state may purchase
commercial insurance, self-insure, or self-insure and purchase
excess commercial insurance in excess of the statutory limits
of this chapter against any risk created or recognized by this
chapter or any action for which a governmental entity or its
employee may be held liable.
(2) (a) In addition to any other reasonable means of selfinsurance, a governmental entity may self-insure with
v respect to specified classes of claims by establishing a
trust account under the management of an independent
private trustee having authority with respect to claims of
that character to expend both principal and earnings of
the trust account solely to pay the costs of investigation,
discovery, and other pretrial and litigation expenses including attorneys' fees, and to pay all sums for which t h e
governmental entity may be adjudged liable or for which
a compromise settlement may be agreed upon.
(b) The monies and interest earned on said trust fund
shall be subject to investment pursuant to Title 5 1 ,
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(2) (a) Notwithstanding Section 63-30d-401, a notice of claim for attorneys'
fees under Subsection 63-30d-301(2)(e) may be filed contemporaneously
with a petition for review under Section 63-2-404.
(b) The provisions of Subsection 63-30d-403(l), relating to the governmental entity's response to a claim, and the provisions of 63-30d-601,
requiring an undertaking, do not apply to a notice of claim for attorneys'
fees filed contemporaneously with a petition for review under Section
63-2-404.
(c) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to a claim for
attorneys' fees under Subsection 63~30d-301(2)(e) may be brought contemporaneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent action.
History: C. 1953, 63-30d-302, enacted by
L. 2004, ch. 267, § 14.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2004, ch 267, § 49
makes the act effective on July 1, 2004

PART 4
NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITY OR A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE
63-30d-401. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents —
Service — Legal disability — Appointment of
guardian ad litem.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a claim arises when the
statute of limitations that would apply if the claim were against a private
person begins to run.
(b) The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claimant
knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known:
(i) that the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity
or its employee; and
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the name of the
employee.
(c) The burden to prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the
claimant.
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted;
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known;
and
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a governmental employee
individually as provided in Subsection 63-30d-202(3)(c), the name of
the employee.
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent,
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and
202
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(ii) directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the
requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to the office of.
(A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is against an
incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county,
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board,
when the claim is against a school district or board of education;
(D) the presiding officer or secretary/clerk of the board, when
the claim is against a special district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of
Utah;
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or
executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public
board, commission, or body; or
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to receive
the notice of claim by the governmental entity under Subsection
(5)(e).
(4) (a) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim
against a governmental entity is sustained by a claimant who is under the
age of majority or mentally incompetent, that governmental entity may
file a request with the court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for
the potential claimant.
(b) If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the time for filing a claim under
Section 63-30d-402 begins when the order appointing the guardian is
issued.
(5) (a) Each governmental entity subject to suit under this chapter shall file
a statement with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code
within the Department of Commerce containing:
(i) the name and address of the governmental entity;
(ii) the office or agent designated to receive a notice of claim; and
(iii) the address at which it is to be directed and delivered.
(b) Each governmental entity shall update its statement as necessary to
ensure that the information is accurate.
(c) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall develop a
form for governmental entities to complete that provides the information
required by Subsection (5)(a).
(d) (i) Newly incorporated municipalities shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a) at the time that the statement of incorporation and boundaries is filed with the lieutenant governor under
Section 10-1-106.
(ii) Newly incorporated special districts shall file the statement
required by Subsection (5)(a) at the time that the written notice of
creation of the district is filed with the State Tax Commission and
State Auditor under Sections 17A-1-102 and 17B-3-215.
(e) A governmental entity may, in its statement, identify an agent
authorized by the entity to accept notices of claim on its behalf.
(6) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall:
(a) maintain an index of the statements required by this section
arranged both alphabetically by entity and by county of operation; and
(b) make the indices available to the public both electronically and via
hard copy.
203
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(7) A governmental entity may not challenge the validity of a notice of claim
on the grounds that it was not directed and delivered to the proper office or
agent if the error is caused by the governmental entity's failure to file or update
the statement required by Subsection (5).
History: C. 1953, 63-30d-401, enacted by
L. 2004, ch. 267, § 15.
Coordination clause. — Laws 2004, ch.
267, § 51 specifies the wording of Subsection

(3)(b)(ii)(A) to coordinate the passage of ch. 267
and L. 2004, ch. 202.
Effective Dates. — Laws 2004, ch. 267, § 49
makes the act effective on July 1, 2004.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
to require every claimant to state clearly all of
the elements of his claims to the board of
commissioners or city council for allowance as a
condition precedent to his right to sue the city
and recover his damages in an ordinary action.
Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P.
1167 (1913).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Application.
Assignment of municipal debt.
Clear statement of claims required.
Conditions for right to recover.
Defendant's capacity.
Failure to file claim.
Notice.
Sufficiency of notice.
—Damages.
—Nature of claim asserted.
—Parties.
—Statement of facts.
Waiver of objections by city.

Conditions for right to recover.
Statutory right to recover is available only
upon compliance with the conditions upon
which right is conferred. One who seeks to
enforce the right must by allegation and proof
bring himself within the conditions prescribed
thereby. Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99 Utah
362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940).

Constitutionality.
Functions of the notice of claim requirement
in giving the affected governmental entity an
opportunity to promptly investigate and remedy defects immediately, in avoiding unnecessary litigation, and in minimizing difficulties
which might attend changes in administration
provide sufficient justification for its imposition
as to governmental but not other tort-feasors,
and therefore notice requirement does not deny
equal protection. Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d
192 (Utah 1977).

Defendant's capacity.
Because it was clear that defendant engaged
in the conduct complained of while performing
his duties as a state employee and the plaintiff
was aware that the defendant claimed to have
acted under color of authority, the plaintiff
could not complain on appeal that the Governmental Immunity Act did not apply because he
meant to sue defendant as an ordinary individual, not for anything he did in the course of his
employment by the state. Nielson v. Gurley, 888
P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899
P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).

Application.
While failure to comply with the Immunity
Act applies to claims for conduct by governmental employees actually occurring in that capacity, it is not invoked for the personal tortious
conduct of a person who happens to also be a
governmental employee merely because he so
asserts. Crisman v. Hallows, 2000 UT App 104,
999 R2d 1249.

Failure to file claim.
Because no claim was filed as required by
this section, action to recover moneys expended
to construct bridge which city had agreed to
construct was barred. Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370,49 P.2d 405
(1934).
Exceptional circumstances were not present
to allow a suit for injuries sustained in a plane
crash, since the fact that the plane crashed
gave the plaintiff reasonable grounds to
question whether a city was enforcing its ordinance and requiring an airline regulated by the
city to keep its airplanes in airworthy condition. Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125
(Utah 1992).
A potential plaintiff's claim that he was prevented from discovering a cause of action for a
plane crash in which he was injured because

Assignment of municipal debt.
Assignment directing city to pay debt it owes
assignor to assignee is not kind of claim required to be submitted to city in accordance
with this statute. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d
40, 440 P.2d 15 (1968) (decided under former
law).
Clear statement of claims required.
The purpose of notice-of-claim requirement is
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may or must be served, 45 A.L.R,5th 173.
Sufficiency of notice of claim against local
government unit as regards identity, name,
address, and residence of claimant, 53
A.L.R.5th 617.
Sufficiency of notice of claim against local
political entity as regards time when accident
occurred, 57 A.L.R.5th 689.
Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, failure to give
or defects in notice of claim against state or
local political subdivision — modern status, 64
A.L.R.5th 519.

notice of claim, 76 A.L.IUd 1244.
Local government tort liability: minority as
affecting notice of claim requirement, 58
A.L.R.4th 402.
Insufficiency of notice of claim against municipality as regards statement of place where
accident occurred, 69 A.L.R,4th 484.
Complaint as satisfying requirement of notice of claim upon states, municipalities, and
other political subdivisions, 45 A.L.R.5th 109.
Persons or entities upon whom notice of injury or claim against state or state agencies

63-30d-402. Time for filing notice of claim.
A claim against a governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of
claim is filed with the person and according to the requirements of Section
63-30d-401 within one year after the claim arises regardless of whether or not
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
History: C. 1953, 63-30d-402, enacted by
L- 2004, ch. 267, § 16,
Effective Dates. — Laws 2004, ch. 267, § 49
makes the act effective on July 1, 2004.

Cross-Referenees. — Health Care Malpractice Act, § 78-14-1 et seq.
Mailing claims to state or political
subdivisions, § 63-37-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Amendments to complaint.
In malpractice action where university physician was granted immunity upon entry of
summary judgment, patient's proposed
amendment to complaint which set forth claims
against the university that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in
the original pleading related back under Utah
R. Civ. P. 15(c) and was not untimely, even
though more than a year had passed since the
original complaint was filed, where no scheduling order had been entered, no trial date had
been set, no expert discovery had taken place,
and discovery was still ongoing. Nunez v. Albo,
2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, cert, denied, 59
P.3d 603.

ANALYSIS

Administrative proceedings.
Amendments to complaint.
Cause of action.
Claims barred.
Claims by minors.
Claims for death.
Compliance with requirements.
Contract action.
Estoppel.
Exemptions.
—Equitable claims.
Federal claim.
Necessity for presentation of claim.
Notice.
Quiet title actions.
Recovery of real property.
Remedy for wrongful act.
Administrative proceedings.
Tenured teacher seeking reinstatement
following decision to terminate his services had
no claim for breach of contract until after adverse result at administrative hearing provided
for by the school termination provisions (now
§ 53A-8-101 et seq.); therefore, where he filed
his notice of claim within the statutory period
after termination of the hearing, he complied
with the relevant requirements. Pratt v. Board
of Educ, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977) (decided
under prior law).

Cause of action.
A cause of action against the state accrues at
the time of the subject accident rather than
when a plaintiff satisfies the threshold
requirements under § 31A-22-309. Jepson v.
State, 846 R2d 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Claims barred.
Neither actual knowledge by county officials
of circumstances which resulted in death of
four-year-old child's mother in an automobile
accident nor minority of the child dispensed
with necessity of filing timely claim in action
against county in which it was alleged that
death was due to inadequate warning signs and
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former section applied to a claim against the
Department of Transportation arising from the
sale of property to the Department, which the
plaintiff claimed was invalid as not properly
executed, because the action was not a claim on
a contractual obligation under former § 6330-5, which would be exempt from former §
63-30-12, but was rather a claim to recover
property under former § 63-30-6. Bullock v.
State, DOT, 966 P.2d 1215 (Utah Ct. App
1998).

(now § 63-30d-202) did not leave the parents
without a remedy for their wrongful birth injury by granting immunity for simple negligence to doctors employed by the state, since
parents had a remedy against the state for
injuries arising out of the negligent acts of state
employees, but the parents failed to give notice
of their claim to the state within one year.
Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186
(Utah 1987).

Remedy for wrongful act.
The 1978 amendment to former § 63-30-4
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J S. Municipal Corporations §§ 2173, 2174,
2199; 78A C.J.S. Schools and School Districts
§§ 659, 669, 678,681; 81AC.J.S. States §§ 470
et seq., 490 et seq.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political
Subdivisions § 629 et seq; 72 Am. Jur. 2d
States, Territories, and Dependencies § 77.
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties §§ 239, 240; 64

63-30d-403. Notice of claim — Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within 60
days — Remedies for denial of claim.
(1) (a) Within 60 days of the filing of a notice of claim, the governmental
entity or its insurance carrier shall inform the claimant in writing that the
claim has either been approved or denied.
(b) A claim is considered to be denied if, at the end of the 60-day period,
the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or
deny the claim.
(2) (a) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the
district court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity.
(b) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of
the claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this
chapter has expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
Effective Dates. — Laws 2004, ch. 267, § 49
makes the act effective on July 1, 2004.

History: C. 1953, 63-30d-403, enacted by
L. 2004, ch. 267, § 17.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Amended complaint.
Dismissal proper.
Estoppel.
Extension of time for filing suit.
Waiver for contractual obligations.
Amended complaint.
Plaintiffs complied with former section
where, within a year after the cause of action
arose, they filed notice of claim with the attorney general and the agency concerned on the

same day they filed the original complaint with
the court, and amended complaint alleging
compliance with the Governmental Immunity
Act was filed, as a matter of right, within one
year after denial of the claim or after the end of
the 90-day period in which the claim is deemed
to have been denied. Johnson v. Utah State
Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980).
Dismissal proper.
Action for conveyance of excess acreage filed
one and a half years after filing a notice of claim
was properly dismissed as being untimely.
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remedies pursuant to § 10-3-1012 before
commencing an action under this chapter,
Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corp., 828 P.2d
1071 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 843
R2d 1042 (Utah 1992).

protect the state and its political subdivisions
from lawsuits arising under the Whistleblower
Act. Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Cor., 2001 UT
34, 24 R3d 958.

In general.
The Governmental Immunity Act does not
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — State and Federal Constitutional Law, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 1070.
A.L.R. — Pre-emption by workers' compensation statute of employee's remedy under state
"whistleblower" statute, 20 A.L.R.5th 677.
Who are "public employers" or "public

67-21-2.

employees" within the meaning of state
whistleblower protection acts, 90 A.L.R.5th
687.
Federal pre-emption of whistleblower's statei a w action for wrongful retaliation, 99 A.L.R.
Fed. 775.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Adverse action" means to discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee in any manner that affects the employee's
employment, including compensation, terms, conditions, location, rights,
immunities, promotions, or privileges.
(2) "Communicate" means a verbal, written, broadcast, or other communicated report.
(3) "Employee" means a person who performs a service for wages or
other remuneration under a contract of hire, written or oral, express or
implied.
(4) (a) "Employer" means the employing state agency or political subdivision of the state.
(b) "Employer" includes an agent of an employer.
(5) "Public body" means any of the following:
(a) a state officer, employee, agency, department, division, bureau,
board, commission, council, authority, educational institution, or any
other body in the executive branch of state government;
(b) an agency, board, commission, council, institution member, or
employee of the legislative branch of state government;
(c) a county, city, town, regional governing body, council, school
district, special district, or municipal corporation, board, department,
commission, council, agency, or any member or employee of them;
(d) any other body that is created by state or local authority, or that
is primarily funded by or through state or local authority, or any
member or employee of that body;
(e) a law enforcement agency or any member or employee of a law
enforcement agency; and
(f) the judiciary and any member or employee of the judiciary.
History: C. 1953, 67-21-2, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 216, § 1; 1989, ch. 189, § 1.
Cross-References. — Executive department, Utah Const., Art. VII.
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Judicial department, Utah Const., Art. VIII.
Legislative department, Utah Const., Art. VI,
State Highway Patrol, Title 53, Chapter 8.
State institutions, Title 64,

PROTECTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

67-21-3

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Employer.
Notice of claim against school district and
individual employee of district that was timely
served, listed the individual, and complied with

§ 63-30-11 was sufficient to establish jurisdio
tion over the individual. Youren v. Tintic Sch.
Dist., 343 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 2003).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments —
Government Affairs, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 254.
A.L.R. — Who are "public employers" or

"public employees" within the meaning of state
whistleblower protection acts, 90 A.L.R.5th
687.

67-21-3. Reporting of governmental waste or violations of
law — Employer action — Exceptions.
(1) (a) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee
because the employee, or a person authorized to act on behalf of the
employee, communicates in good faith the existence of any waste of public
funds, property, or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law,
rule, or regulation adopted under the law of this state, a political
subdivision of this state, or any recognized entity of the United States.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (a), an employee is presumed to have
communicated in good faith if he gives written notice or otherwise
formally communicates the waste, violation, or reasonable suspicion to the
state auditor. This presumption may be rebutted by showing that the
employee knew or reasonably ought to have known that the report is
malicious, false, or frivolous.
(2) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because
an employee participates or gives information in an investigation, hearing,
court proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other form of administrative
review held by the public body,
(3) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because
the employee has objected to or refused to carry out a directive that the
employee reasonably believes violates a law of this state, a political subdivision
of this state, or the United States, or a rule or regulation adopted under the
authority of the laws of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the
United States.
(4) An employer may not implement rules or policies that unreasonably
restrict an employee's ability to document the existence of any waste of public
funds, property, or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of any laws,
rules, or regulations.
History: C. 1953, 67-21-3, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 216, § 1; 1989, ch. 189, § 2; 1992,
ch. 187, § 1.

Cross-References. — Libel, Title 45, Chapter 2; § 76-9-501 et seq.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Restrictions on waste reporting.
While this chapter prohibits employers from
implementing "rules or policies that unreasonably restrict an employee's ability to document
the existence of waste," it does not prohibit an
employer from creating any rules or policies
regarding waste reporting. Baird v Cutler, 883
F. Supp. 591 (D. Utah 1995).

ANALYSIS

Activities not protected.
Restrictions on waste reporting.
Cited.
Activities not protected.
Discipline for failure to abide by reasonable
established procedures, or for rudeness or incivility, even when it occurs in connection with
"whistleblowing," does not violate this chapter.
Baird v. Cutler, 883 F. Supp. 591 (D. Utah
1995).

Cited in Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280
(Utah 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments —
Government Affairs, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 254.

67-21-4. Remedies for employee bringing action — Proof
required.
(1) As used in this section, "damages" means damages for injury or loss
caused by each violation of this chapter.
(2) An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring a civil
action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both, within 180
days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter.
(3) An action begun under this section may be brought in the district court
for the county where the alleged violation occurred, the county where the
complainant resides, or the county where the person against whom the civil
complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business.
(4) To prevail in an action brought under the authority of this section, the
employee shall establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
employee has suffered an adverse action because the employee, or a person
acting on his behalf engaged or intended to engage in an activity protected
under Section 67-21-3.
History; C. 1953, 67-21-4, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 216, § 1; 1989, ch. 189, § 3; 1996,
ch. 198, § 39; 1999, ch. 177, § 1.

Cross-References. — Grounds for injunction, Rule 65A, U.R.C.R

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Waiver of limitations period.
The statute of limitations in Subsection (2) of
this section is phrased permissively, indicating
that the existence of the public employee's right
not to suffer adverse action for reporting legal
violations is not predicated on the filing of suit
within the limitations period, but simply that
the right may not be vindicated if suit is not
timely filed, and thus, for purposes of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(c), the statute of limitations defense is

a classic affirmative defense which is waivable
and not a "condition precedent" to the suit.
Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296 (10th
Cir. 2003).
Affirmative defense of failure to comply with
limitations period in Subsection (2) was waived
by defendants' failure to include it in the district court's pretrial order, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e).
Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296 (10th
Cir. 2003).
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JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150.

78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing
fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election held
more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter,
the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences
on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge
whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until a
successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of
Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Stare decisis.
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the
Court of Appeals governs all later cases involving the same legal issues decided by other

panels of that court and all courts of lower
rank. Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904
P.2d 677 (Utah 1995).

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction*
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
14

A-14
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78-2a-3

(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
.(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994,
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch.
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49; 2001, ch. 255,
§ 20; 2001, ch. 302, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend-

ment by ch 255, effective April 30, 2001, added
"parent-time" in Subsection (2)(h)
The 2001 amendment by ch 302, effective
April 30, 2001, inserted "or charge" in Subsection (2)(e) and made stylistic changes
This section has been reconciled by the Office
of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
Cross-References. — Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15,39-6-16
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Time to prepare.
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by two-day notice of hearing to release property subject to
writ of attachment where he had adequate time
to prepare for hearing and defendant was required to post cashier's check in lieu of security.
Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 R2d 236
(1974).
—Continuance.
Surprise.
Neither plaintiff's failure to serve motion for
continuance five days before date set for hearing nor failure to file affidavits accompanying
motion justified denial of motion where plaintiff's counsel did not learn of reason for plaintiff's inability to appear at hearing m time to
make motion five days before hearing and Rule
40(b) does not expressly require affidavits to
accompany motion for continuance. Bairas v.
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 R2d 375 (1962).

Rule 7

2d 52, 337 P.2d 429 (1959); Western States
Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58,
504 P.2d 1019 (1972); Connelly v. Rathjen, 547
P.2d 1336 (Utah 1976); Genuine Parts Co. v.
Larson, 555 P2d 285 (Utah 1976); McEwen
Irrigation Co. v. Michaud, 558 P.2d 606 (Utah
1976); Utah Chiropractic Ass'n v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 579 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1978);
Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Utah DOT, 589
P.2d 782 (Utah 1979); Albrecht v. Uranium
Servs., Inc., 596 R2d 1025 (Utah 1979); Ute-Cal
Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 628
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981); Bennion v. Hansen, 699
R2d 757 (Utah 1985); K.O. v. Denison, 748 P.2d
588 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); P & B Land, Inc. v.
Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274 (Utah Ct App. 1988);
Huston v, Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 1991);
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367
(Utah 1996); Low v. City of Monticello, 2002 UT
90, 54 P.3d 1153.

Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299,
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 20 et
seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders
§ 10; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 114-117,
227-229.
°
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 8;
66 C. J.S. Notice § 27 et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading
§§ 98, 114, 219; 72 C.J.S. Process §§ 72, 78.
A.L.R.—Vacating judgment or granting new
trial in civil case, consent as ground of after
expiration of term or time prescribed by statute
or rules of court, 3 AJL.R.3d 1191.
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to
timely prosecute action, 15 A.L.R.3d 674.

Validity of service of summons or complaint
on Sunday or hohday, 63 A.L.R.3d 423. f
Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Consequences of prosecution's failure to file
timely brief in appeal by accused, 27 AX.R.4th
213.
What constitutes bringing an action to trial
or other activity in case sufficient to avoid
dismissal under state statute or court rule
requiring such activity within stated time, 32
A.L.R.4th 840.

PART IIL PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
Rule 7. Pleadings, allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders, objection to commissioner's order.
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim;
a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned
under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer,; if a third-party
complaint is served* Nor other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court
may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.
(b) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion
which, unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in
writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the
grounds for the relief sought.
(6) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except
uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting
memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in
opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition,
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to

Rule 7
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rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other
memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a
proposed order to its initial memorandum.
/
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument
without leave of the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of
argument without leave of the court.
The court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex
parte application and a showing of good cause.
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the
responding party.
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts'in
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing
ps^rty shall provide a,n explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For
any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain
a table of contents and a table of authorities with page references.
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery
materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request,
the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit
for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a
hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action
or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively
decided.
(f) Orders.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment
of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial,
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to
the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party
A
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Rule 7

preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an
objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of
a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A
party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same
manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made
in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement,
ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion.
(Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The practice
for courtesy copies varies by judge and so is not
regulated by rule. Each party should ascertain
whether the judge wants a courtesy copy of that
party's motion, memoranda and supporting
documents and, if so, when and where to deliver them.
Paragraph (f) applies to all orders, not just
orders upon motion.
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amendment deleted "denominated as such" after
"counterclaim" in Subdivision (a); rewrote Subdivisions (b) and (c); and added Subdivisions (d)
to(g).
The 2004 amendment inserted "or in proceedings before a court commissioner" in Subdivision (b); substituted the first paragraph in
Subdivision (c)(2) for a list of maximum lengths
for different types of memoranda; in Subdivision (f)(2), substituted "serve upon the other
parties" for "file" in the first sentence and added
the last sentence; in Subdivision (g), substituted "recommendation" for "recommended order" several times and substituted "made in
open court" for "entered" and added the clause
beginning "or, if" in the second sentence; and
added the second paragraph of the Advisory
Committee Note.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 7, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. —Amendment of pleadings to conform to evidence, motion for,
U.R.C.P. 15(b).
Commencement of action, U.R.C.P. 3.
Consolidation of defenses made by motion,
U.R.C.P. 12(g).

Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.R 13.
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12.
Denial of motion, pleading after, U.R.C.R
12(i).
Directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motion for, U.R.C.P. 50.
Dismissal of actions, U.R.C.P. 41.
Eminent domain proceedings, contents of
complaint in, § 78-34-6.
Evidence in support of motion, U.R.C.P.
43(b).
Execution and proceedings supplemental
thereto, U.R.C.P. 69.
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.P. 65B.
Forcible entry or detainer, proof required,
§ 78-36-9.
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10.
"Judgment" defined, U.R.C.P. 54(a).
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2.
Partition of property, complaint to set forth
interests of all parties, § 78-39-2.
Pleading special matters, U.R.C.P. 9.
Relief from judgment or order, U.R.C.P. 60.
Requirements of signature, U.R.C.P. 11.
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and
other papers, U.R.C.P. 5.
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P.
65B(a).
Supreme Court, rulemaking power of, § 782-4.
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside,
U.R.C.P. 65A.
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P.
6(d).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Motions.
—Amendments.
Complaint.
Prayer for relief.
—New trial.
Particularization.
—Setting aside conditional order.
Orders.
—Correction.
Cited.
Motions.
-Amendments.
Complaint.
Investors who lost money in a failed investment venture and whose multi-count complaint

stemming from their losses was dismissed were
properly denied the opportunity to amend their
complaint because they never filed an actual
motion, but merely cited Rule 15 without articulating any reasons why leave to amend their
136-page, 725-paragraph complaint was merited. Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 79 R3d 974.
Prayer for relief.
Although a trial court may cleny a motion to
amend the complaint for a movant's failure to
present a written motion and a proposed
amended complaint, that rule does not apply to
the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c),
the prayer does not limit the relief which the
court may grant. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills
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were properly set aside where trial court failed
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65,
475'R2d 1005 (1970).
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action,
promptly objected to date set for trial on the
ground that their counsel had an already
scheduled appearance in another court on that
date, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v.
Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
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Time for appeal.
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran from
the date of notice of entry of such judgment,
rather than from the date of judgment. Buckn er v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124,
288 R2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank &
Trust Co v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);
J.RW. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 R2d 486 (Utah
1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986);
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 R3d 277.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In
Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham
v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §
265 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218,
AX.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to
liability against defaulting defendant, 8
A.l.R.3d 1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and

hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.
Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial,
or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255.
Failure to give notice of application for default judgment where notice is required only by
custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed 190.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
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(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
garty opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party" or attorney
may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation
—Experts
—Extension of time to submit.
—Failure to submit.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal
—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Applicability.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion.
Compliance with rule.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.

Disputed facts.
Effect of denial.
Evidence
—Admissions of plaintiff.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Unsupported motion.
—Weight of testimony.
Implicit rulings.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Contract interpretation.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Intent to remove trustee.
—Lease as security.
—Notice.
—Wills.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
^
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Purpose.
Scope.
Summary judgment improper.
—Damage to insured vehicle.
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Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187 (Utah
1974).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 1004 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584.

A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of
judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, how.ever, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on
any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit
of any one of the jurors.
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial.
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion oxjfrejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
that it is against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than
10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Harmless error not
ground for new trial, Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment,. Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.
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(3) Subject to limitations imposed by law, any trial court of record may hold
court in any location designated by this rule
(Added effective January 1, 1992, amended effective November 15, 1995,
November 1, 2001, April 1, 2003.)
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amendment deleted "Park City" from the list of locations of trial courts and added new Subdivision
(2), redesignating former Subdivision (2) as (3)

The 2003 amendment deleted "Murray" and
"Roy" from the list of municipalities m Subdi
vision (1)

Rule 4-408.01. Responsibility for administration of trial
courts.
Intent:
To designate the court locations administered directly through the administrative office of the courts and those-administered through contract with local
government pursuant to § 78-3-21.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record and to the administrative
office of the courts
Statement of the Rule:
(1) All locations of the juvenile court shall be administered directly through
the administrative office of the courts
(2) All locations of the district court shall be administered directly through
the administrative office of the courts, except the following, which shall be
administered through contract w ith county or municipal government pursuant
to § 78-3-21 Fillmore, Junction, Kanab, Loa, Manila, Manti, Morgan,
Panguitch, Randolph, and Salem.
(Added effective November 15, 1995, amended effective January 27, 1997;
November 1, 1998; November 1, 2001)
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amendment deleted "Coalville" and "Park City" from
the list in Subdivision (2)

ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for
fil
supporting memoranda
and documents with the court
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary
relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda
(1)(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested
or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and
authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to
relevant portions of deposfoions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in
support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-parte
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application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and
if the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(1)(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall file
and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a
memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation.
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion
within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify the
clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph
(1)(D) of this rule.
(1)(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's memorandum.
(1)(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit
the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in the form of a
separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The
Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion was
served, the date the memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, the date
the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties.
If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(2)(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the
movant relies.
(2)(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as
to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise
statement of material facts which support the party's contention. Each
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party
relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the
opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(3)(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
ordered by the court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs
(3)(B)or(4)Wow.
(3)(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or
any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time
of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion
may file a written request for a hearing.
(3)(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the
motion or opposition to the amotion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue
or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been
authoritatively decided.
(3)(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the
matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter shall be
h^ard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing and
notify all parties of the date and time.
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(3)(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting
or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at
least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing.
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court.
(3)(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file
their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived.
(3)(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before
the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date
without leave of the court.
(3)(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party fails to file
a memorandum in opposition, the moving party may withdraw the request or
the court on its own motion may strike the request and decide the motion
without oral argument.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request
may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and
the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996;
November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2001.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment substituted "claim" for "issues" in Subdivision (3)(B).
The April 2001 amendment added the second
sentence to Subdivision (1)(D) and made stylistic changes in the subdivision designations.
The November 2001 amendment, in Subdivision (2)(B), at the end of the first sentence

substituted the language beginning "contains a
verbatim restatement" for "a concise statement
of material facts as to which the party contends
a genuine issue exists" and deleted "and, if
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence
or sentences of the movant's facts that are
disputed" at the end of the second sentence,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Decisions sua sponte.
Purpose.
Request for hearing.
Supplemental memoranda.
When rule applies.
Cited.
Decisions sua sponte.
While a court may refrain from addressing a
matter that is not submitted for decision under
this rule, nothing in this rule or any other rule
bars a court from deciding such a matter sua
sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980
P.2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah
1999).
No notice to submit for decision under this
rule is required, and a trial therefore correctly
determined that it could rule on pending motions sua sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App
139, 980 P.2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271
(Utah 1999).
Purpose.
The purpose of the code of judicial administration is not to create or modify substantive
rights of litigants, but to bring order to the
manner in which the courts operate. Scott v.

Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 P.2d 214, cert,
denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999).
Request for hearing.
Once a request for hearing by one of the
parties has been granted and the matter set for
hearing, the other party has a right to rely upon
such setting regardless of whether it made its
own request. Price v. Armour, 949 P. 2d 1251
(Utah 1997).
Supplemental memoranda.
The plural "memoranda" in Subdivision (l)(a)
refers to all memoranda received by the court
— from all parties that either oppose or support
any motion — and does not mean that each
party may submit more than one memorandum; thus, the trial court was well within its
discretion in refusing to accept a supplemental
memorandum that was submitted without
prior invitation and' outside the bounds of procedural rules. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State,
888 P.2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
When rule applies.
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection
to the plaintiff's first affidavit was framed as a

b..1A.

